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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
B.B.,
A person under 18 years of age.

CaseNo.20020404-SC

KIMBERLY and KENNETH SCOTT,
Respondents on Certiorari
(Appellants in Court of
Appeals),
vs.
SUSAN and GARTH HARDINGER,
Petitioners on Certiorari
(Appellees in Court of
Appeals).

HARDINGERS' OPENING BRIEF ON CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2002) grants jurisdiction to the Utah Supreme
Court to review of an opinion of the Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari. The Court
granted Hardingers' petition for writ of certiorari by order entered August 29, 2002. In re
B.B.. 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002).
Hardingers dispute that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the decision
of the Juvenile Court. This is an appeal from an order of the Juvenile Court, and jurisdiction

1

over this type of appeal is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) (Supp.
2002). As explained in Points III and IV of this brief, however, the order appealed from was
not a final order and there was no appeal from the attorney fee order. The Court of Appeals
therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed March 21, 2002. State ex rel. B.B.
OC.S. v. S.H.\ 2002 UT App 82,45 P.3d 527 (referred to herein as "Opinion"). A copy is
in the appendix.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Where couples who had participated in raising a child settle their competing

claims regarding the child by agreeing in court that one couple will be permitted to adopt the
child and the other couple will have ongoing visitation rights, does entry of the adoption
decree pursuant to the settlement preclude enforcement of the visitation portions of the
settlement? This presents a question of law and statutory interpretation which is reviewed
for correctness. L.S.C. v. State (In re Adoption of A.B.\ 1999 UT App 315, If 8, 991 P.2d
70, 73.
2.

Does the juvenile court have jurisdiction to enforce its own valid orders, even

though it may no longer have independent jurisdiction over the child? This presents a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Department of Human Services. Office
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of Recovery Services v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
3.

Where a juvenile court determines it has jurisdiction to consider an order to

show cause on visitation issues and denies a motion to quash the order to show cause, but
does not enter any order resolving all the issues raised by the order to show cause, is the
denial of the motion to quash appealable as a final order? This presents a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. State ex rel. M.W.. 2000 UT 79,fflj23-26, 12 P.3d 80,
85 (Utah 2000)
4.

Did the court of appeals have jurisdiction to review a separate order awarding

attorney fees where the notice of appeal did not mention the order? This presents a question
of law reviewed for correctness. Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ^f 7,
977 P.2d 474.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Copies of the controlling statutes appear in the appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a juvenile court order denying a

motion to quash an order to show cause. The order to show cause concerned violation of
a visitation order entered in a guardianship case.
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B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The Scotts' (paternal aunt and

uncle) petition for custody of B.B. was filed February 23, 1999. (R. 1-9.)

Hardingers

(maternal grandparents1) intervened (R. 41-42) and filed a counter-petition for custody on
May 12, 1999. (R. 49-57.) On June 15, 1999, the Guardian ad Litem filed a petition to
terminate the parental rights of the natural parents. (R. 134-139.) An order terminating the
parental rights was entered January 28, 2000. (R. 278-286.)
Prior to the trial on the competing petitions for custody (treated by the juvenile court
as also seeking guardianship of the child, (R. 529 Tf 6)), the Hardingers and the Scotts
reached an agreement that Scotts would be permitted to adopt B.B. in exchange for which
Hardingers would be granted certain specified visitation rights. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 330-337) and an Order of Custody and Decree of Guardianship (R.
338-343) were entered on May 19, 2000. A Decree of Adoption entered June 5, 2000,
granted the Scotts' petition to adopt B.B. (R. 529, lj 8.)
Scotts denied visitation after the adoption decree, and on August 21, 2000, the
juvenile court issued an order to show cause to the Scotts. (R. 368-369.) Scotts moved to
quash the order, asserting the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction because of the
adoption. (R. 392-393,370-377.) The juvenile court denied the motion to quash and made

Although the Hardingers were the biological maternal grandparents of B.B., their rights
in this action are based on the stipulation reached with Scotts and approved by the Juvenile
Court after the parental rights of both biological parents had been terminated and before the
decree of adoption had been entered. At the time of the stipulation and order, B.B. had no
legal parents, and neither Hardingers nor Scotts had any legal relationship to her other than
as individuals who had historically been her caregivers.
4

other orders aimed at ultimately resolving the order to show cause. (R. 528-533.) In a
separate order, the juvenile court awarded Hardingers their attorney fees. (R. 525-527.)
Scotts filed a notice of appeal. (R. 536-538.) Hardingers moved to dismiss the appeal
for lack ofjurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied the motion and deferred the issue for
plenary consideration with the merits. Following oral arguments on the appeal, the Court
of Appeals entered an opinion resolving the issues in favor of Scotts, with Judge Orme
dissenting.
C.

Statement of Facts.

B.B. was born July 29, 1996. From the time of her birth until March 12, 1999, a
period of 31 months, she resided predominantly with Hardingers, her maternal grandparents.
(R. 531 J 27.) On February 23,1999, while B.B. was still living with Hardingers, the Scotts
filed a petition in juvenile court seeking custody of B.B. (R. 1-9). On March 12, 1999,
B.B.'s mother signed a document purporting to transfer custody to Scotts. (R. 13-16, 528
Tj 1.) The mother later rescinded that document and explained she had signed it only because
she was mad at her parents, that she had been coerced into signing it, and she understood it
was only temporary (R. 96-99), but custody of B.B. was nonetheless transferred to Scotts.
Hardingers filed their own petition for custody on May 12,1999. (R. 528 ^f 2.) The parental
rights of the biological parents were terminated on November 23, 1999. (R. 528.)
Following participation in court ordered mediation, on May 19,2000, the Hardingers
and the Scotts made an agreement to resolve their competing claims for custody. The Scotts
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promised to allow future visitation to the Hardingers in exchange for which Hardingers
agreed to support the adoption of B.B. by the Scotts. (R. 529 Tflj 5-6.) At the time of this
agreement, B.B., who was nearly four years old, had lived with Hardingers for the first 31
months of her life and with the Scotts for 14 months.
Seventeen days after the May 19, 2000, settlement agreement, on June 5, 2000, the
juvenile court granted a decree of adoption to the Scotts. The decree did not mention the
visitation rights. (R. 529 ^f 8.) The juvenile court expressly found, however, that it would
not have granted the adoption but for the prior stipulation and order granting visitation rights
to the Hardingers. (R. 531fflf2-3; Opinion ^ 20 (Orme, J., dissenting).)
Only nineteen days after the adoption, Scotts denied Hardingers visitation. (R. 530
Tf 22.) The initial justification for the denial was a claim of sexual abuse,2 but the juvenile
court found this claim did not justify the visitation denial particularly after safeguards were
suggested. (R. 530 ^ 23.) Hardingers obtained an order to show cause seeking to have
Scotts held in contempt for violating the visitation order and seeking makeup visitation and
other sanctions. (R. 368-69.) In response, the Scotts filed a motion to quash the order to
show cause, claiming the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the prior visitation
order. (R. 392-393.)
On October 24, 2000, the juvenile court entered an order, entitled "Finding of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Order," denying the motion to quash. (R. 528-533.) The court also

Subsequent proceedings in the juvenile court, not part of the record, demonstrated that
the claim of sexual abuse was completely unfounded.
6

entered a separate order, entitled "Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgment," granting
attorney fees to the Hardingers related to the order to show cause. (R. 525-527.) On
November 1,2000, Scotts filed a notice of appeal, stating that they appealed "the ruling of
the Court on the Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without reopening the
file." (R. 536-538.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals incorrectly viewed this case as implicating the right of parents
to raise their child. The right of Scotts to raise their child was not impaired, however,
because Scotts voluntarily agreed to the challenged visitation. Rather, this appeal presents
the question of whether parties who have stipulated to a court order to resolve a lawsuit can
later avoid the stipulation and order simply because the parties have changed their minds.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the juvenile court's enforcement of Scotts'
voluntary stipulation somehow interfered with Scotts' right to raise their child. Although
permanency in adoptive placements is an important legislative goal, allowing parents to
ignore their own agreements does not promote permanency.
A court always has jurisdiction to enforce its own valid orders. The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that because the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to issue new
visitation orders, it therefore lacked jurisdiction to enforce its prior orders. Nothing in the
adoption statutes nor in the juvenile court statutes abrogates the inherent jurisdiction and
duty of the juvenile court to enforce its own order.
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The order appealed from, by its own terms, was not final. The juvenile court held it
had jurisdiction to proceed, and ordered an evaluation as part of the ongoing proceedings.
The holding that the order was final departed from prior rulings of this Court.
The purported challenge to the attorney fee award is also jurisdictionally deficient.
Scotts' notice of appeal did not include the attorney fee award. The holding of the Court of
Appeals to the contrary departed from prior rulings of this Court.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
ADOPTIVE PERMANENCY IS NOT PROMOTED BY
PERMITTING PARENTS TO UNILATERALLY
CHANGE OR IGNORE THEIR OWN VOLUNTARY
AGREEMENTS REGARDING POST-ADOPTION
VISITATION.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,6566 (2000), that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in making decisions concerning
the best interests of their children without interference from the state or others. Utah
statutes, as recognized by the opinion of the Court of Appeals, grant adoptive parents these
same rights. Opinion ^ 14. The instant appeal does not in any way challenge the right of
parents under normal circumstances to make decisions concerning their child. The issue
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presented by this appeal, rather, is whether parents are sovereigns able to make and change
those decisions at will without regard to their own prior agreements and court orders.
The Court of Appeals held parents are not bound by their own agreements regarding
the best interests of their child if the parents later change their minds as to whether the
agreement was in the best interest of the child. The Guardian Ad Litem and the Scotts urged
the Court of Appeals to take this position based on a claim that it was necessary to promote
the sanctity of adoptions. The public policy of the state does not, however, require the
avoiding of a visitation contract made in anticipation of adoption, particularly where that
contract merely provided for the continuance of an established relationship which the
prospective parents, at the time of the contract, agreed was in the best interest of the child.
The validity of pre-adoption visitation contracts is an important issue of law which should
be settled by this Court.
A.

The holding that the juvenile court imposed a visitation order on Scotts is
contrary to the record.

The Court of Appeals held:
The juvenile court's fashioning of a conditional decree
of adoption is not consistent with the above principles.
Furthermore, a conditional decree of adoption would impose a
duty upon the Parents that is not generally required of natural
parents; namely, that the Parents either make their child
available to visit with non-relatives not of their choosing or be
held in contempt of court.
Opinion <[j 16 (italics added).
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The fallacy of this conclusion is that the juvenile court order did not require the Scotts
to make their child visit with non-relatives not of their choosing. Scotts agreed to the
visitation order. It was not imposed on them. Scotts helped choose the times for visitation.
Scotts agreed that the visitation be with Hardingers. Scotts' attorney drafted the order.
Scotts agreed that the visitation was in B.B.'s best interest. (R. 338-343.) There was no
claim nor evidence that Scotts were in any way coerced to make this agreement. It was
entirely voluntary. It was simply wrong to hold that the visitation order "imposed" on Scotts
an obligation to make B.B. available to visit with non-relatives "not of their choosing."
Granted, the visitation with Hardingers was "not of [Scotts'] choosing" at the time
for enforcement of the visitation order. It would be a very dangerous precedent indeed,
however, to hold that a stipulated order is somehow rendered less voluntary and less
enforceable just because the parties do not continually reaffirm their desire to enter into the
stipulation anew. The fact that Scotts do not now choose to honor their contract does not
mean that the initial contract was not of their own choosing. Adoptive parents should
generally not be forced to make their child available for visitation with non-relatives, but
there was no force here.
B.

An Agreement Is Binding Even If the Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Impose It.

Absent the Scotts' preadoption stipulation, it is likely that the juvenile court could not
have awarded visitation to Hardingers postadoption. The lack of an independent basis for
visitation does not, however, impair the enforceability of the visitation right. The concept
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that a court may enforce an agreement which the court would not have had authority to
impose is not new to Utah law. In Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), a father
agreed to provide support for two of his children so long as they resided with the mother and
were full-time students. He later discovered two court opinions which held the trial court
lacked authority to impose support past age twenty-one and sought an order vacating his
obligation to provide support past the twenty-first birthday of each child. He also relied on
a statutory change which clarified that the court cannot impose support past age twenty-one.
The court rejected his claim, noting the distinction between the statutory authority to impose
an order and the authority to enforce an agreement:
Defendant has failed to observe the distinction between
those cases involving the statutory power of a court in a divorce
proceeding to enter orders concerning support and those cases
in which the parties in a divorce action have settled their
property rights by agreement, the terms of which are
incorporated in a decree. The limitations on the power of the
court to order support do not limit the rights of a husband and
wife to contract with respect to the education of their children
as part of an agreement settling their property rights. A
husband, who has undertaken an obligation in consideration of
the provisions of the property settlement agreement which were
for his benefit, cannot subsequently complain that the court, in
the absence of such agreement, would have been without power
to order him to do so.
627 P.2d at 527.
The court further noted the inequity which would be inherent in allowing the husband
to retain all the benefits of his having made an agreement but avoid the burden of that
agreement:
11

Defendant has not urged any compelling reasons for
invoking the powers of equity to abrogate the property
settlement; nor has he shown a change of circumstances to
justify modification of the child support payments. Over a
period of three years the parties were involved in attaining an
agreement. Both made concessions in exchange for benefits.
. . . It is a proper assumption that plaintiff settled for the sum
she received in reliance on the availability of additional funds
to assist the children, living with her, in completing their
education.
It would be highly inequitable under the
circumstances of this case to permit defendant to retain the
benefits and be relieved of the obligations he assumed in his
bargain with plaintiff.
627 P.2d at 528.
Other courts have recognized this concept that a party may agree to and be bound by
obligations beyond that which the court could have imposed initially.

In Kotler v.

Spaulding. 510 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987), the court held: "We are of opinion
that there is a significant difference between a provision for education rendered by a judge
pursuant to [the statutory provision allowing for support until age 21] following litigation,
and a judgment or order which incorporates and requires compliance with the provisions of
a bargained-for agreement." The court further held that such a voluntary agreement "may
be enforced by means of a contempt proceeding." Id
By pretending to promise that Hardingers would have ongoing visitation rights,
Scotts obtained Hardingers' consent to the adoption. The court likely would not have been
able to make the finding required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-9 (Supp. 2002) that the
adoption was in the best interest of B.B. but for the stipulation that B.B. would enjoy
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ongoing visitation with the Hardingers-the Juvenile Court expressly found that that
stipulation was necessary for the court to have granted the adoption and that the visitation
was in B.B.'s best interest. (R. 531 fflf 2, 4.) It was only thirty-six days later, after the
adoption had been granted,3 that Scotts denied any obligation to honor their agreement and
allow visitation. Where Scotts already had the benefit they wanted under the agreement, it
is manifestly inequitable to shield them from honoring their obligations under the agreement.
C.

Conditional adoptions are not contrary to Utah statutes or public policy.

The Court of Appeals held: "The juvenile court's fashioning of a conditional decree
of adoption is not consistent with the above principles," Opinion Tf 16, apparently referring
to the legislative goal to prevent disruption of adoptive placements. Opinion ^f 14. This
presents an important question of state law which has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court: Does this State permit conditional or open adoptions? The negative answer of the
Court of Appeals to this question conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and of the
Court of Appeals's own expression of public policy.4
In In re Adoption of Hallowav. 732 P.2d 962,972 n. 11 (Utah 1986), this Court noted
that "[a]n innovative approach to adoption, called an open adoption, is gaining increased

3

In light of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(2) (Supp. 2002), which provides that a
"fraudulent representation . . . is not a basis for . . . vacation of an adoption decree," and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(3) (Supp. 2002), which states that an "adoption may not be
contested after the final decree of adoption is entered," it would have been very difficult for
Hardingers to have undone the adoption at that point.
4

The decision is also squarely at odds with the Juvenile Court's finding that the visitation
was in the best interests of B.B.
13

recognition among professionals in the adoption field and may be suited to this case."
Notwithstanding this favorable reference by this Court to open adoptions in 1986, the Court
of Appeals has now held that Utah law precludes the post-adoption enforcement of any preadoption visitation agreement or order, at least where the agreement arises in the juvenile
court5. The statutes and cases do not support this ruling.
The adoption decree was entered barely two weeks after the visitation order. The
juvenile court held it would not have granted the adoption if the parties had not agreed to
the visitation order. (R. 531ffij2-3; Opinion K 20 (Orme, J., dissenting).) Under established
case law, the visitation order and adoption decree must be considered contemporaneous, and
the later adoption decree did not bar the prior visitation order. Stubbs v. Hemmert 567 P.2d
168, 169-70 (Utah 1977) (the determination of whether or not merger occurs depends on
whether the terms of the earlier contract are collateral to the subsequent document, and
"depends to a great extent on the intent of the parties with respect thereto."); Shields v.
Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("when two agreements are executed
substantially contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a
whole and harmonized if possible") (quotation marks and citations omitted).
It is important to emphasize the context in which this issue arises. Hardingers and
Scotts had competing petitions seeking custody of and guardianship over B.B. Scotts had
recently obtained physical custody of B.B., but historically B.B. had resided in the Hardinger
5

The court's logic would apply only to juvenile courts. Pre-adoption visitation orders
would continue to be enforceable in district court. See Point II at page 17.
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home. (R. 531, ^| 27.) To resolve the competing petitions, the parties agreed that Scotts
would adopt B.B. but Hardingers would continue to have visitation. The Decree of Adoption
did not, therefore, change the existing placement of B.B.
In situations where the existing placement does not change, public policy (and the
best interest of the involved child) favors continuing, not terminating, existing bonds of the
child:
Furthermore, in home placement cases, like the present
case, we emphasize that there is no need for the state to intervene on behalf of the child and cut off the rights of the natural
father to ensure immediate and continued physical care or
uninterrupted bonding of a child to its new adoptive parents,
because the mother continues to fulfill a parental role. Especially when the mother and child live with an adoptive
grandparent under circumstances which will remain the same,
allowing a father to continue to provide financial support and
maintain his relationship with the child has the potential of
benefitting, not harming, the child.
T.S.v.L.F.. 2001 UT App 183, Tf 20,27 P.3d 583 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
As in T.S., the instant case is a "home placement" case. B.B. had already been living
with the Scotts for a brief period, and while living with the Scotts had enjoyed ongoing
visitation with Hardingers. Prior to that B.B. had lived with Hardingers. The Decree of
Adoption did not change that placement with Scotts, so public policy clearly favors
promoting B.B.'s best interest by allowing Hardingers to continue their relationship with
her.
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The one thing that all of the evaluators agreed on in this case was that Hardingers
were important to B.B. and that it was in her best interest that they continue to have
extensive visitation rights. Scotts willingly stipulated to those visitation rights in order to
procure the Hardingers' cooperation in the adoption. Although Scotts now want to renege
on their stipulation, nothing in the statutes or case law shields them from being required to
comply with their agreement.
The juvenile court also focused on several Court of Appeals opinions which hold that
the visitation rights of grandparents end upon termination of parental rights. Opinion Tf 13.
This principle has no application here, because Hardingers' visitation rights arose by
agreement and court order, not because of their status as the biological grandparents of B.B.
The parental rights of the biological parents were terminated on November 23, 1999. (R.
528.) The visitation rights at issue in this case were created by stipulation and order on May
19,2000. At that point, neither the Scotts nor the Hardingers had any legal right to visitation
by reason of the biological relationship, but only as historical caregivers to B.B. Cases
which hold that biological grandparents have no post adoption visitation rights therefore
have no application to this proceeding.
POINT II
A JUVENILE COURT HAS JURISDICTION
ENFORCE ITS OWN ORDER.

TO

The Court of Appeals determined that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over B.B.
terminated when the adoption occurred. The court extrapolated from that conclusion to hold
16

that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enforce its own prior visitation order. Not only
is it bad policy to hold that a court cannot enforce its own order, but it is contrary to the
juvenile court statutes and not supported by the logic of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held:
In reading the statutes relating to child welfare
proceedings and to adoptions so as to harmonize them,
we conclude that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction
over the Parents or B.B. after the adoption took place.
The statutes share a common goal of providing stable,
permanent homes for adoptive children and allowing
these newly formed families to exist on the same basis as
all other families. Hence, once its basis for jurisdiction
ended, the juvenile court could not assume jurisdiction
over B.B. until and unless the requisite statutory
requirements for jurisdiction were reestablished.
Opinion Tf 15.
This quotation illustrates that the Court of Appeals was concerned with the concept
of open or conditional adoptions. Rather than squarely holding that conditional adoptions
are invalid (something which should be left to the legislature, Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Provo. 94 Utah 203, 250, 74 P.2d 1191, 1211 (Utah 1937)), the Court of Appeals strained
to construct a jurisdictional bar. The logic of the Court of Appeals cannot stand scrutiny.
The fallacy of the court's reasoning is evident when one considers the validity of a
pre-adoption visitation agreement made in district court. District courts have jurisdiction
over adoptions except where the juvenile court has terminated parental rights, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-3a-104(l)(o), 78-30-7(1) (Supp. 2002), yet are courts of general, not limited,
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jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 2002). Had the visitation order here been
entered by the district court, there would be no question that the court retained jurisdiction
to enforce the order. Principles of equal protection do not permit invalidating a pre-adoption
visitation order entered in juvenile court while enforcing an identical order entered in district
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-121(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2002) provides that the juvenile court
can terminate its own jurisdiction by express order to that effect. The Court of Appeals
expanded the statutory language to hold that jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until
there is any order that resolves the initial basis for jurisdiction. Opinion ^ 11-12. The
majority of the Court of Appeals ignored the equally binding provision that the juvenile
court always retains jurisdiction to enforce its own orders through the contempt power. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-901(l) (Supp. 2002) provides: "Any person who willfully violates or
refuses to obey any order of the court may be proceeded against for contempt of court."
The Court held the juvenile court jurisdiction continued "until a permanent custody
order or adoption was achieved. Opinion U 12. The Order of Custody and Decree of
Guardianship entered shortly before the adoption (R. 338-343), however, was such a
permanent custody order. Under the logic of the Court of Appeals, the Order of Custody
and Decree of Guardianship terminated the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, leaving it
without jurisdiction to grant the adoption.
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The Court of Appeals also asserted that the Hardingers' visitation rights terminated
upon the termination of the biological parents' rights. Opinion ^f 13. That termination,
however, occurred months before the visitation order under review. (R. 278-286.) The
Hardingers' visitation rights arose from the Scotts5 agreement and the juvenile court's order,
not from the biological relationship. Because the visitation rights were not based on the
biological relationship, the adoption did not terminate those rights.
It is important to understand the nature of the order under appeal. All the juvenile
court did was enforce its own prior order. The previous order, entered May 19,2000, only
implemented an agreement made by the parties. The appealed order did not "award" postadoption visitation rights, it only enforced a prior order. No one claimed the prior order was
improper or invalid.
The issue presented by this case is whether a court retains jurisdiction to enforce its
own order. The answer must be "yes." That is all that occurred here. To enable them to
adopt B.B., Scotts agreed that Hardingers could have visitation. The Decree of Adoption
was entered only 17 days after the visitation order. Once they got what they wanted, Scotts
then attempted to renege on their part of the bargain. Scotts don't deny they agreed to the
visitation and agreed in was in B.B.'s best interest, they just claim the juvenile court now
lacks jurisdiction to compel them to honor their agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (Supp. 2002) expressly grants the juvenile court the
contempt power to enforce its orders. A court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce its own
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order, even when the initial justification for jurisdiction is gone. Koehlerv.Grant 213 B.R.
567,569 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (bankruptcy court can enforce order by contempt proceeding
after case is closed); Cramer v. Petrie. 637 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ohio 1994) (court can enforce
child support order by contempt after child is emancipated). In Cramer, the court held:
Furthermore, we see no reason why a court's inherent
authority to enforce a lawfully issued child support order must
end when the child is emancipated. More is at stake than the
mere nonpayment of support. Also at stake is the court's strong
interest in seeing, as a general matter, that its orders are not
disobeyed with impunity. This interest exists independently of
the child who is the subject of the order because it concerns the
exercise of the court's judicial functions and ultimately the
public's confidence in the judicial system.
637 N.E.2d at 884-85 (italics added).6
Scotts have not questioned that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter the
visitation order. It follows that the court had jurisdiction to enforce that order. Even though
the court may have lost jurisdiction to make new orders regarding visitation, the court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the order previously made.

6

The Court of Appeals asserted that Cramer was distinguishable because it involved an
order which was violated before the child's status changed. Opinion at f 16 n. 5. While the
facts in Cramer may be technically different than the facts in the present action, the principle
for which Cramer was cited is still very applicable. It would seriously erode public
confidence in the judicial system to allow a party to disobey an order with impunity solely
because of a change in the status of the child-a change that was contemplated at the time the
order was entered. Public confidence in the judicial system would be eroded if a party could
receive a benefit from promising to grant visitation but then be excused from having to
actually allow the visitation. The courts should not condone duplicity.
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POINT III
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM WAS NOT FINAL
BECAUSE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REMAIN PENDING
BEFORE THE JUVENILE COURT.
An appeal as of right may be taken only from a final order. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). A
final order is one which "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
do but execute the judgment." Croslandv.PecL 73 8 P.2d 631,632 (Utah 1986) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Determining the finality of a juvenile court order is problematic.
There may be several final orders during the time the minor is subject to the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. This case presented the situation of retained jurisdiction to review the
child's welfare. In addition, the order to show cause which invoked the court's jurisdiction
had not been resolved. The Court of Appeals focused on the retained jurisdiction, but
ignored the incomplete resolution of the order to show cause.
Scotts appealed the denial of their motion to quash an order to show cause. The
Court of Appeals held the denial was an appealable order, apparently concluding that the
denial order actually ruled on the merits of the order to show cause. The Court of Appeals
held: "[t]he finality was not affected by the juvenile court's retention ofjurisdiction over the
juvenile for further proceedings." Opinion ^j 7. While it is true that the juvenile court
retained jurisdiction for further proceedings, the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the
juvenile court never actually ruled on the order to show cause. Although the court resolved
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the primary, jurisdictional issue raised by the order to show cause, other substantive issues
remain pending before the juvenile court.
The order to show cause raised six specific numbered issues, plus one catch all. Of
those six, only two were resolved by the juvenile court's order. Among the issues which
remain pending are requested makeup visitation and a re-evaluation of custody. (R. 368 fflj
2, 6.) Also pending was Hardingers' request for more specific orders regarding telephone
visitation, (R. 368 ^ 4) and for reimbursement for counseling costs. (R. 368 If 5.) The order
under appeal resolved none of these issues.

It ordered a family and psychosexual

investigation (R. 531 ^ 5) and left the cost of that evaluation to be determined by future
order. (R. 532, Conclusions ^j 6, Order ^ 7.) It temporarily limited Mr. Hardinger's right to
unsupervised visitation, with ongoing visitation apparently to be reviewed after the
psychosexual evaluation. (R. 532 ^f 4.) In short, the order resolved the jurisdictional issue
and established a plan for resolution of the remaining issues. It did not resolve any issue
except jurisdiction to consider the remaining issues.
The Court of Appeals analogized the instant case to a divorce proceeding where the
court determines custody but retains continuing jurisdiction to modify the determination.
Opinion ^ 8 n. 2. A more accurate analogy would be to a temporary order of custody in a
divorce case. The juvenile court here held that it had jurisdiction and that visitation would
continue as provided in the pre-adoption order, but never resolved many of the issues raised
by the order to show cause. It is evident from the wording of the post adoption visitation
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order that the court intended to resolve the remaining order to show cause issues after the
evaluation and investigation by Dr. Jay Jensen. R. 531 % 5.
The denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion to quash leaves the action still pending
and is not a final order. Little v. Mitchell 604 P.2d 918, 919 (Utah 1979); R.H.D. v. S.F.
(In re Babv KX 967 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Although the juvenile court's
holding that it had jurisdiction resolved the primary disputed issue and left the parties with
little interest in fine-tuning the visitation, jurisdiction is not determined from the parties'
interest in pursuing the litigation to its final finish, but by whether any part of the dispute
still technically remains. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, If 15, 998 P.2d 254 (an
unresolved attorney fee claim defeated finality, even though the primary dispute had been
fully resolved); A.J. Mackav Co. v. Okland Construction Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah
1991) (finality defeated by pending counterclaim even though the primary dispute had been
resolved and no one was interested in pursing the counterclaim; "acquiescence of the parties
is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court").
Because there was no final order to appeal, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction.
The appeal should have been dismissed. This Court should, accordingly, vacate the opinion
of the Court of Appeals.
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POINT IV
THE HOLDING THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
INCLUDED THE ATTORNEY FEE ORDER
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISION IN
JENSEN V. INTERMOUNTAINPOWER AGENCY.
The Court of Appeals appears to have adopted a rule that, when multiple orders are
issued a following a single hearing, an appeal of only one of those orders automatically
includes the other orders. This holding is not supported by the language of Rule 3 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and conflicts with this court's holding in Jensen v.
Intermountain Power Agency. 1999 UT 10, 977 P.2d 474.
Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "the notice of appeal
. . . shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." The requirement
is jurisdictional. Jensen. 1999 UT 10, U 7, 977P.2d474,476. The Jensen court reaffirmed
that the notice of appeal must state "specifically which judgment is being appealed." Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Is apparent from the record that at least two separate matters were heard by the
juvenile court on September 6,2000. One was the order to show cause issued at the request
of the Hardingers, which included a request for attorney fees. The second was the Scotts'
motion to quash that order to show cause. The court issued two orders following the
hearing: Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement ("Attorney Fee Order"), which addressed
only attorney fees for contempt, and Finding of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (labeled
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by the Court of Appeals as "Visitation Order"), which denied the motion to quash and held
the juvenile court had ongoing jurisdiction.
The notice of appeal in this case states that it appeals "the ruling of the Court on the
Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file." The Court
of Appeals, after quoting the language of the notice of appeal, held: "While the notice
provided by this statement is not ideal, it sufficiently notifies the Grandparents that the
orders resulting from the September 6,2000 hearing are being appealed, particularly where
the orders bear the same date." Opinion Tf 10. This conclusion is puzzling, because nothing
in the notice of appeal specifies the date of the hearing nor the date of the order being
appealed. Moreover, the language of the notice of appeal was not a generic reference to all
matters raised the hearing-in fact, the notice does not even mention the hearing. What the
notice of appeal did mention was a single7 specific ruling: "the ruling of the Court on the
Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file." The only
order in the file which matches this description is the Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law
and Order entered October 24, 2000.
Jensen and Appellate Rule 3 hold the notice of appeal must specify the order appealed
from. The Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement (R. 525-27) is not specified in the

7

The definite article "the" "is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or
generalizing force of'a' or 'an.'" Brooks v. Zabka. 450 P.2d 653,655 (Colo. 1969) (citations
omitted). Accord State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App. 136,ffi[ 15,28,2P.3d954,958n.2,961
(both the majority and concurring opinions agreed on the limiting nature of "the").
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Notice of Appeal, either by inference or by association. This Court should hold there was
no valid appeal from the Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement.
POINT V
HARDINGERS SHOULD BE AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

THEIR

The juvenile court awarded Hardingers their attorney fees incurred in enforcing their
visitation rights. This Court should similarly award Hardingers their attorney fees on appeal.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998).
CONCLUSION
This Court should leave to the legislature the policy determination of whether
conditional adoptions should be barred. The attempt of the Court of Appeals to create such
a bar through a flawed jurisdictional analysis should be reversed. The case should be
remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings on the order to show cause.
The judgment for attorney fees in favor of Hardingers should be reinstated, and
Hardingers should be awarded their attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this _ / ^ d a y of November, 2002.

JOHN L. VALENTINE and
(J
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Attorneys for Appellees
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
fl
K.S and K.S. (the Parents) are the adoptive parents of B.B,
They appeal a juvenile court order asserting jurisdiction to
enforce a pre-adoption visitation order issued in favor of S.H.
and G.H., B.B. 's biological maternal grandparents (the
Grandparents), after the Parents adopted B.B. The Parents also
appeal the juvenile court's order awarding attorney fees to the
Grandparents. Because we conclude the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction, we reverse both orders.
BACKGROUND
%2 The parental rights of B.B.'s biological mother and father
were terminated after the juvenile court determined B.B. was a

neglected child. The Parents1 and the Grandparents filed
competing petitions for custody and guardianship of B.B. To
resolve the dispute, the Grandparents agreed to withdraw their
petition and allow the Parents to obtain custody in exchange for
visitation rights. The Grandparents also agreed to support the
Parents' adoption of B.B. The juvenile court then entered an
order establishing a visitation schedule (the Pre-adoption
Visitation Order) stipulated to by the parties. Seventeen days
later, the juvenile court granted the Parents' adoption petition.
The adoption decree did not mention the Pre-adoption Visitation
Order or visitation in any form for the Grandparents.
1f3
After the Parents adopted B.B., they initially allowed the
Grandparents to exercise visitation as specified in the Preadoption Visitation Order. Out of concern for B.B., however, the
Parents terminated B.B.'s visits with the Grandparents. The
Grandparents then filed an Order to Show Cause requiring the
Parents to appear in juvenile court to show cause why they should
not be held in contempt for not abiding by the Pre-adoption
Visitation Order. The Parents filed a Motion to Quash the Order
to Show Cause, claiming the juvenile court's jurisdiction ended
when it granted the Parents' petition for adoption. The juvenile
court denied the Motion to Quash and entered two separate orders:
(1) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order (the Visitation
Order) ; and (2) Order of Attorney Fees and Judgment (the Attorney
Fee Order). The Visitation Order asserted jurisdiction and
granted the Grandparents visitation rights pursuant to the
stipulated Pre-adoption Visitation Order. The Attorney Fee Order
required the Parents to pay the Grandparents' attorney fees
incurred for the Order to Show Cause. This appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1|4
The Grandparents argue that the Visitation Order is notfinal; thus denying this court jurisdiction. We determine
whether an order is final as a matter of law. See In re M.W.,
2000 UT 79,1(1(23-26, 12 P. 3d 80. The Grandparents also contend
that the Parents» appeal of the Attorney Fee Order was not
adequately raised in the Parents' Notice of Appeal. We determine
whether the Notice of Appeal is adequate to grant this court
jurisdiction as a matter of law. See Jensen v. Intermountain
Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,1(7, 977 P.2d 474.
1J5
The Parents and the guardian ad litem argue the juvenile
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Visitation
Order subsequent to the adoption decree. Whether a court has
1.

K.S. is the sister of B.B.'s biological father.
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subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review
for correctness. See Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins.
Co. , 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The Parents also
argue that because the juvenile court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, it should not have awarded attorney fees. In this
context, we review the award of attorney fees for correctness.
See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,1113,
432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44.
ANALYSIS
I.

Finality of the Visitation Order

1(6
The Grandparents argue this court lacks jurisdiction because
the Visitation Order was not a final order. The Visitation Order
stated, among other things, that the juvenile court had subject
matter jurisdiction to enforce the Pre-adoption Visitation Order,
and the Grandparents were entitled to visitation rights as set
forth in the Pre-adoption Visitation Order. Subsequent to the
Visitation Order, the juvenile court reviewed the Pre-adoption
Visitation Order and modified it. Because of these subsequent
modifications, the Grandparents argue that the Visitation Order
was not a final order. We disagree.
1|7
The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over appeals
from juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-909(l) (1996).
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: "An
appeal may be taken from a . . . juvenile court to the appellate
court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and
judgments . .
" Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (emphasis added).
Generally, "a judgment is final when it ends the controversy
between the parties litigant." Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT
50,H9, 5 P.3d 649 (citation and quotations omitted). In In re
M.W. , 2000 UT 79,1126, 12 P. 3d 80, the supreme court held that an
order entered after an adjudication hearing on a petition of
abuse was final for purposes of appeal. The finality was not
affected by the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction over
the juvenile for further proceedings. In so holding, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
The finality of an order in juvenile
proceedings is determined the same way as the
finality of an order in other courts . . .
"A final, appealable older is one that ends
the current juvenile proceedings, leaving no
question open for further judicial action."

20000949-CA

3

[T]he juvenile court continues to have
jurisdiction over and periodically reviews
the case, but that does not mean the . . .
adjudication is not final.
Id. at H1J25-2G (citations omitted) . Accordingly, even though a
juvenile court periodically reviews its orders, the orders may
still be final for purposes of appellate review.
H8
The Visitation Order expressly held that the juvenile court
had subject matter jurisdiction over B.B., and that the
Grandparents were entitled to visitation rights under the Preadoption Visitation Order. The hearing subsequent to the
issuance of the Visitation Order was merely a review of that
order. The Visitation Order resolved the controversy between the
parties as raised in the Order to Show Cause concerning the
juvenile court's jurisdiction to enforce the Pre-adoption
Visitation Order. Because the Visitation Order was final, we
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.2
II.

Adequacy of the Notice of Appeal

H9
While conceding that the Attorney Fee Order was final for
purposes of appeal, the Grandparents argue that because the
Parents failed to mention the Attorney Fee Order in their Notice
of Appeal, it is not properly before this court. For an appeal
to be properly raised, "[t]he notice of appeal . . . shall
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from
. . . . " Utah R. App. P. 3(d). The Utah Supreme Court has held
that this requirement is jurisdictional because "'the object of a
notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal
has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular case.'"
Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,117, 977 P.2d 474
(quoting Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 15 Utah 2d 126, 388
P.2d 798, 800 (1964)). However, " [n]otices of appeal are to- be
liberally construed." Roberson v. Dranev, 54 Utah 525, 182 P.
212, 213 (1919) (citations and quotations omitted); see also
U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303,1128, 990 P.2d
945.
HlO The Parents' Notice of Appeal states that they appeal "the
ruling of the court on the Motion to Quash and Objection to
Setting Hearings without re-opening the file." While the notice
2 . Similar circumstances exist in divorce proceedings when the
court initially determines which parent shall have custody of the
children and the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent,
subject to the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify those
determinations. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 2001).
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provided by this statement is not ideal, it sufficiently notifies
the Grandparents that the orders resulting from the September 6,
2000 hearing are being appealed, particularly where the orders
"bear the same date.3 Therefore, the Notice of Appeal is
sufficient for this court to assume jurisdiction over the issue
of attorney fees.
III.

Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court

1Jll The Parents and the guardian ad litem argue the juvenile
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Visitation
Order subsequent to the adoption decree. Under Utah law, the
juvenile court can maintain continuing jurisdiction over B.B.
until she is 21 years old, unless the court terminates
jurisdiction prior to that time. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a121(1) (Supp. 2001). "The continuing jurisdiction of the court
terminates . . . upon order of the court." Id. § 78-3a121(2) (a) (i) . Hence, the dispositive issue is whether a decree
of adoption is an "order of the court" that terminates the
juvenile court's jurisdiction. To resolve this issue, we turn
first to the plain language of Utah's juvenile court statutes and
adoption statutes. See State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 n.2
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (" [T] he primary consideration in statutoryconstruction is 'to give effect to the legislature's intent. To
discover that intent, this court looks first to the plain
language of the statute.'" (Citation omitted.)); see also Lyon
v. Burton, 2000 UT 19,1117, 5 P.3d 616 ("The plain language of a
statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 'with
other statutes under the same and related chapters.'" (Citation
omitted.)).
1fl2 Utah's juvenile courts are creatures of statute, and thus
are courts of limited jurisdiction. See In re adoption of
Trimble, 16 Utah 2d 188, 398 P.2d 25, 26 (1965); In re S.L.-.- 1999
UT App 390,152, 995 P.2d 17 (Wilkins, P.J., concurring). Because
they are courts of limited jurisdiction, juvenile courts are
allowed to do only what the legislature has expressly authorized.
See In re S.L. , 1999 UT App 390 at ^52 (stating juvenile court
"powers are necessarily limited"). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104
describes the bases for the juvenile court's original
jurisdiction. In this case, the juvenile court acquired
jurisdiction over B.B. because she was allegedly abused and
neglected. See id. § 78-3a-104(l) (c) . The juvenile court
ultimately granted the guardian ad litem's petition to terminate
3. To avoid contentions over this issue in the future, we
strongly encourage appellants to provide in the notice of appeal
the caption and date of the orders from which they appeal.
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the parental rights of B.B.'s biological parents. See id. § 783a-411. At that point, B.B. had no legal parents and the
^juvenile court had jurisdiction until a permanent custody order
or "adoption was achieved. See id. § 78-3a-104(l) (c) . Once the
juvenile court granted the Parents' petition for adoption, the
original basis for jurisdiction over B.B. ceased to exist because
B.B. was no longer an abused or neglected child and permanency
had been achieved. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-312 to
-313 (Supp. 2001).
1fl3 Based on the above statutory provisions, this court has held
that visitation rights of both biological parents and
grandparents end upon termination of parental rights. See In re
A.B. , 1999 UT App 315,1121, 991 P. 2d 70 ("Grandmother's visitation
rights were extinguished by operation of law when the court
terminated her child's parental rights."); Kasper v. Nordfelt,
815 P.2d 747, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]here a child has been
released [for adoption] any visitation rights of the child's
natural family end with the initiation of such adoption
proceedings."). 4
1fl4 With respect to adoption in Utah, the legislature has
expressly found that
(a) the state has a compelling interest in
providing stable and permanent homes for
adoptive children in a prompt manner, in
preventing the disruption of adoptive
placements . . . .

(c) adoptive children have a right to
permanence and stability in adoptive
placements;
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally
protected liberty and privacy interest in
retaining custody of an adopted child.

4. As permitted by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (i), the
Grandparents submitted Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(4) (Supp. 2001) as
supplemental authority, claiming that it provides this court with
an independent basis to affirm the juvenile court's decision.
However, we do not consider this argument because the proceedings
at issue were not conducted pursuant to section 30-5-2(4) and, as
a result, the juvenile court did not consider any possible
application of the cited statute. In addition, the Grandparents
failed to raise this issue below and have not briefed the issue.

20000949-CA

6

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (1996) .
petition for adoption:

In order to grant a

(1) The court shall examine each person
appearing before it . . . separately, and if
satisfied that the interests of the child
will be promoted by the adoption, it shall
enter a final decree of adoption declaring
that the child is adopted by the adoptive
parent or parents and shall be regarded and
treated in all respects as the child of the
adoptive parent or parents.
(2) The court shall make a specific finding
regarding the best interest of the child,
taking into consideration information . . .
relating to the health, safety, and welfare
of the child and the moral climate of the
potential adoptive placement.
Id. § 78-30-9 (Supp. 2001).
Consistent with the legislature's
stated intent to prevent the disruption of adoptive placements,
Utah adoption law states, "[T]he adoptive parent or parents and
the child shall sustain the legal relationship of parent and
child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties
of that relationship."
IcL. § 78-30-10 (1996).
^15
In reading the statutes relating to child welfare
proceedings and to adoptions so as to harmonize them, we conclude
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction over the Parents or
B.B. after the adoption took place. The statutes share a common
goal of providing stable, permanent homes for adoptive children
and allowing these newly formed families to exist on the same
basis as all other families. Hence, once its basis for
jurisdiction ended, the juvenile court could not assume
jurisdiction over B.B. until and unless the requisite statutory
requirements for jurisdiction were reestablished.
See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061 (2000)
(" [S] o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
. . . there will normally be no reason for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question
the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning
the rearing of that parent's children.").
liio The juvenile court's fashioning of a conditional decree of
adoption is not consistent with the above principles.
Furthermore, a conditional decree of adoption would impose a duty
upon the Parents that is not generally required of natural
parents; namely, that the Parents either make their child
available to visit with non-relatives not of their choosing or be

20000949-CA
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held in contempt of court. See In re A.B., 1999 UT App 315 at
n.l (noting that " [v]isitation between grandmother and" the
children is now at the discretion of the adoptive parents"). 5
Therefore, because B.B.'s adoption ended the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, we reverse the juvenile court's Visitation Order.
IV.

Attorney Fees

tl7 The Parents appeal the juvenile court's award of attorney
fees. Because the juvenile court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, it follows that it lacked jurisdiction to assess
attorney fees against the Parents. See Burns Chiropractic Clinic
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
("Because we reverse the trial court . . . we also reverse the
court's grant of attorney fees."). Therefore, we reverse the
award of attorney fees and order each party to pay its own
attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
1fl8 This court has jurisdiction because the Visitation Order is
a final order and because the Notice of Appeal provided adequate
notice that the appeal included the Attorney Fee Order. The
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over this case after B.B.'s
adoption, and could not grant an adoption petition conditional on
visitation rights in the Grandparents. Therefore, the juvenile
court could neither enforce the Pre-adoption Visitation Order
after the adoption, nor assess attorney fees against the Parents.
Accordingly, we reverse.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

5. The Grandparents cite Cramer v. Petrie, 637 N.E.2d 882 (Ohio
1994) , for the proposition that allowing the Parents to disregard
the Pre-adoption Visitation Order encourages disobedience of
juvenile court: orders. We find the facts of Cramer to be
distinguishable. In Cramer, the court sought enforcement of a
phi 1H

qnnnnrf

r\-rr\&r

t-hat-

uiac

^rinl qfoH

-r\-rn r>v* t- Q t h e

Child ' S

emancipation, although the enforcement action commenced after
emancipation. See id. at 883. In this case, the Order to Show
Cause related to failure to comply with an order that was lawful
when entered, but not lawful or enforceable after the adoption
when the order was allegedly violated.
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1fl9

I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

ORME, Judge (dissenting):
1[2 0 What actually happened here is this: The adoptive parents
and the grandparents, each of whom had had the care of the child
at different times, filed competing adoption petitions. The
parties ultimately stipulated to a resolution the trial court
found to be in the child's best interest: the adoptive parents
would adopt the child and the grandparents would have visitation,
a schedule for which was specifically agreed to. Once they got
what they wanted--adoption--the adoptive parents reneged on their
agreement and withheld visitation. When this bait-and-switch was
called to the trial court's attention, the court was
understandably concerned about the adoptive parents' failure to
adhere to their stipulated obligations and the court's order.
This failure is particularly troubling in view of the trial
court's explicit finding that, but for the visitation agreement,
it would not have granted the adoptive parents' adoption
petition. Like any court, the trial court here had jurisdiction,
even though a final judgment had been entered, to enforce its
prior orders. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (1) (Supp. 2001).
1|21 In my view, then, this is not a case about whether
conditional adoption is permitted in Utah or about the legal
effect of an adoption decree. It is, first and foremost, a case
about whether a trial court has the power to enforce an order
stipulated to by parties over whom it had jurisdiction and which
order was a quid pro quo for the judgment both sides asked it to
enter.
f22 Because the trial court clearly has such power and prudently
exercised it in this case, I would affirm.

Grego3£^K. Orme, Judge
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Mr. BROOK J. SESSIONS (6 J U>»
HARRIS & CARTER, a L.L.C.
Attorney for the SCOTTS
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone:
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ST ATI- til UTAH, In

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BLUNDELL, BAYLIE

(07/29/96)

( ase: 968282

Person(s) under (18) years of age.

Judge: JERIL B. WILSON
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rli 27,

2000. The issues before the Court were a h-titn>n toi Custody and
Guardianship file : v\

- n and Kimberly Scott; a Petition tor Custody

a:

i i Mill H,ijili"«rei

•<)i Grandparent Visitation !iu\: r
the court
c<
Sessions

.orraine Warren.

.nul .i Petition
Present before

> - e petitioners, Ken and Kimberly Scott with their
^

cssions. Lorraine Warrc
v

. * attorney Brook

-t< . . 1 Garth Hardinge

Burrows; Kelly Frye from the Guardian •: i :iem's office

* ; •!* of

m e parties entered a Stipulation into the record and

agreed to be bound thereby.

Based upon the stipulation, the Court

hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Maternal Grandparents, Susan and Garth
Hardingers', petition for custody should be allowed to be
withdrawn by the Hardingers.

2.

The Court should grant guardianship and permanent
legal and physical custody of Baylie Blundell to Kimberly
and Ken Scott.

3.

The Scott's have filed a Petition for Adoption of Baylie
Blundell based upon the agreement of the Hardingers;
the Hardingers have agreed to support the adoption.

4.

Contact with the biological parents should not be
allowed unless the Scott's, Lorraine Warren, or the
Hardingers supervises contact.

The biological parents

are never to be with Baylie Blundell in an unsupervised
setting.

The biological parent's parental rights have been

terminated.

Nothing in these findings or subsequent

order shall give the biological parents any right to
enforce any visitation with Baylie Blundell.
5.

The Hardingers should be awarded statutory visitation as
set forth in Utah Code Annotated 30-33-35.

Said

visitation should be modified as set forth herein.
6.

The Hardingers will exercise visitation with Baylie on
alternating weekends.

They will be allowed to pick up

Baylie at 4:30 p.m. on Fridays and return her by 7:30

p.m. on Sundays every other weekend.
Midweek visitation by the Hardingers will be on those
r

wet.-!-

eekend

Hardingers ^

u a

return her
VV

' tai. r
Kx\ .-

30 p.m

i

:•

joe

f

f

'

ccur.

The

•<

^ midweek visits.

recognized holidays <>r school holidays

family having Bay lie with them

n\ duu weekend will also

have the holiday.
T h a n k s g i v i n g 1: 1 o 1 i d

• *r • r i i\ i •

For Thanksgiving 2000 the Hardingers

* : a i u i.

\.i.e r,. lie

with them from Wednesday before the holiday at 6:00
p.in

i in

iul;i>i MIIIMVUIIJ.! liu tiuml.r, ai 7:30 p.m.

Thereafter, they will have Bavin

with them even

iher

year.
Christm*!'*
with the

imitation should '*•-

4

pecified.

Baylie will be

- nit's for then f.

^i,.J..v

prior to Christmas Day from approximately
until 8:00 p.m.
parlv r v r p
to 8:00 p.m.

She will go

-; ' *- She •

:ie Hardingers' family
pi -\iniaiely J'Oll p.m.

always n.

v •* h*- v:otts on

Christmas morning and Christmas Eve after
Hardinger

I lie Christmas school break will be

divided appiuAiiiiatilj1 equally
having Baylie the firs* half
and the other par", having

ie Christmas School Break
nc second half of the

Christmas School Break as worked out with the special
master.
11.

Baylie will spend July 3 rd and July 4th of each year with
the Scott's.

Baylie will be with the Hardingers on July

23 r d beginning at 6:00 P.M. and all day on the 24th unless
the 24th (Pioneer Day) is celebrated on Saturday or
Monday due to it falling on Sunday, then the visit will
begin the day before it is celebrated at 6:00 P.M. and
continue until 11:00 P.M. the day it is celebrated.
12.

The parties will provide each other with an itinerary of
vacation plans for all extended vacations.

Said itinerary

will include phone numbers.
13.

The Hardingers will call Baylie on Wednesday evenings
when they do not have mid-week visits and on Sunday
evenings when they do not have weekend visits.

The

calls will be made between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.

The

parties will work with the Special Master to arrange
appropriate phone calls during extended visitation and
to make arrangements for one additional weekly phone
call.

Baylie will be allowed to contact either of the

families at any time or any place.
14:
QjyJ.

The Hardingers will have four weeks of vacation time (28
days) with Baylie. dujkig^oummoi

15.

vaialJi|ii_Jiia^

For the year 2000, the Hardingers will have vacation with
Baylie from April 18th at 10:00 a.m. until April 22nd at
6:00 p.m.

+

16.

'1 ho tiaidiiiget

nil have Baylie on June 18th from 8:30

A.M. through June J4 1 ,,i "7 ]\) i'fu

i.n an extended

vacation.
17.

-::

A

*.

Baylie August 15, 2000 through

August 21 st , Tom

- u

to 7:30 p.m. on

the 21 st .
18.

Although not one ot the four weeks fnr
w&atktft, 'he Haiiliiu't i

nur

r\Vf)nr

Aill have Baylie from December

27 th through January 1st, 2001, this i\ I In second half of
the Christmas School Break.
1°

Tii. ivm,i...

Hardingers/foax^saa^

vacation for the ycai

- : ea UUL wA..i* the

i.-*.

Special Master.
20.

Thi Seott^ ^tull have four weeks of family vacation with
Baylie.

21.

For the year 2000, Baylie *-;11 N* wit]

^n

AI in I 'Mli through April 16th for a trip :
22.

Baylie will

•

•*

•!

14,h ior a naseball tourname;,
23

'

y

;:irough the

• •».

Bavlie \\\U Hi win ;MC Scott's from JU u
11! I v

24

Disney Land.

*•

mough

»* * :eo

Lorraine Warren
each year.

:

...

The visitation

• \feudal

jimniei

visitation

Uu \ear 2000 shall be from

August -lih through August 13th and a liki amount each
year
25.

thereafter.

The parties will work with the Special Mastc ••'

scheduling events such as birthdays and other family
events.
26.

The parties have agreed to and the Court should appoint
a Special Master.

If available, Liz Dalton should be

appointed by the Court to be a Special Master.

The cost

of the Special Master should be shared equally for joint
sessions.

For individual time with the Special Master, the

party who is having the individual time with the Special
Master shall be responsible for payment for that time.
27.

The Special Master should be appointed to work with the
parties to implement the visitation schedule, facilitate
communication and assist in problem solving.

28.

The Special Master may consult with the Guardian ad
Litem as necessary.

29.

The parties have agreed to work with a Special Master
and to adopt a family plan which will include but is not
limited to the provisions set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-33.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties.

2.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

3.

The Court should enter a Decree of Custody and Guardianship
to the Scott's.

4.

An Order shoulc no entered by the t.'ouri adopting the pnoi
Findings ol Fact and implementing the same.
.^iii"""'//,,.
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Approved as to Form:

Kelly Frye
Approved as Lo Form:

Dana Burrows

cou^

/•#

^ ^ - 6 ^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, I personally mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing on this

'ZS

day of

f\pf')

\

, 2000, by

first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem
Attn: Kelly Frye
32 W. Center Street, Suite #205
Provo UT 84601
Mr. Dana Burrows
Attorney for Garth and Susan Hardinger
1149 W. Center
Orem, Utah 84057

APPENDIX "C"
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FILED
MAY 1 9 2000
juvenile Court
Fourth District
Mr. BROOK J. SESSIONS (6136)
HARRIS & CARTER, a L.L.C.
Attorney for the SCOTTS
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone:

375-9801

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest of:

ORDER OF CUSTODY AND
DECREE OF GUARDIANSHIP

BLUNDELL, BAYLIE (07/29/96)

Case: 968282

Person(s) under (18) years of age.

Judge: JERIL B. WILSON

1
THIS MATTER having came before the court on March 27,
2000. The issues before the Court were a Petition for Custody and
Guardianship filed by Ken and Kimberly Scott; a Petition for Custody
and Guardianship filed by Susan and Garth Hardinger; and a Petition
for Grandparent Visitation filed by Lorraine Warren.

Present before

the court were petitioners, Ken and Kimberly Scott with their
counsel Brook J. Sessions; Lorraine Warren with her attorney Brook
Sessions; Susan and Garth Hardinger with their attorney Dana
Burrows: Kelly Frye from the Guardian ad Litem's office on behalf of
the child.

The parties entered a Stipulation into the record and

agreed to be bound thereby.

Being duly advised and having made

appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
hereby enters the following:
ORDER OF CUSTODY AND DECREE OF GUARDIANSHIP
1. The Maternal Grandparents, Susan and Garth Hardingers',
petition for custody has been withdrawn upon Motion of the
Hardingers.
2. The Court hereby grants guardianship and permanent legal and
physical custody of Baylie Blundell to Kimberly and Ken Scott.
3. The Hardingers have agreed to and are Ordered to support the
Adoption of Baylie Blundell by the Petitioners, Kimberly and Ken
Scott.
4. Contact with the biological parents shall not be allowed unless
the Scott's, Lorraine Warren, or the Hardingers supervises
contact.

The biological parents are never to be with Baylie

Blundell in an unsupervised setting.
parental rights have been terminated.

The biological parent's
Nothing in this order shall

give the biological parents any right to enforce any visitation with
Baylie Blundell.
5. The Hardingers are awarded and may exercise statutory visitation
as set forth in Utah Code Annotated 30-33-35.

Said visitation is

modified as set forth herein.
6. The Hardingers shall be allowed to exercise visitation with Baylie
on alternating weekends.

They may pick up Baylie at 4:30 p.m.

on Fridays and return her by 7:30 p.m. on Sundays every other
weekend.

7. Midweek visitation by the Hardingers will be on those weeks
when weekend visitation does not occur.

The Hardingers may

pick up Baylie at 4:30 p.m. and shall return her by 7:30 p.m. for
midweek visits.
8. When statutorily recognized holidays or school holidays fall on a
^gigfflHag Thursday, Friday, or Monday, the family having
Baylie with them on that weekend will also have the holiday.
9. For Thanksgiving 2000 the Hardingers will have Baylie with them
from Wednesday before the holiday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday
following the holiday at 7:30 p.m.

Thereafter, they will have

Baylie with them every other year.
10.

Baylie will be with the Scott's for their family party on the
Sunday prior to Christmas from approximately 4:00 p.m. until
8:00 p.m.

She will go to the Hardingers' family party every

Christmas Eve from approximately 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

She

will always be with the Scotts on Christmas morning and
Christmas Eve after the Hardingers' party. The Christmas school
break will be rij>irkri npprQiuuintdy equally with one household
having Baylie the first half of the Christmas School Break and the
other party having the second half of the Christmas School Break
as worked out with the special master.
11.

Baylie will spend July 3 rd and July 4th of each year with the
Scott's.

Baylie will be with the Hardingers on July 23rd beginning

at 6:00 P.M. and all day on the 24lh unless the 24th (Pioneer Day)
is celebrated on Saturday or Monday due to it falling on Sunday,
then the visit will begin the day before it is celebrated at 6:00

P.M. and continue until 11:00 P.M. the day it is celebrated. The
parties will provide each other with an itinerary of vacation plans
for all extended vacations.

Said itinerary will include phone

numbers.
12.

The parties shall provide each other with an itinerary of
vacation plans for all extended vacations.
include phone

13.

Said itinerary is to

numbers.

The Hardingers may call Baylie on Wednesday evenings when
they do not have mid-week visits and on Sunday evenings when
they do not have weekend visits.
7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.

The calls shall be made between

The parties are to work with the Special

Master to arrange appropriate phone calls during extended
visitation and to make arrangements for one additional weekly
phone call.

Baylie shall be allowed to contact either of the

families at any time or any place.
14.

The Hardingers will have four weeks (28 days) of vacation
time with Baylie dagk%—M+H.unei wHruliun fioiii

15.

s^l^el.

For the year 2000, the Hardingers will have vacation with
Baylie from April 18th at 10:00 a.m. until April 22nd at 6:00 p.m.

16.

The Hardingers will have Baylie on June 18th at 8:30 A.M.
through June 24th at 7:30 P.M. for an extended vacation.

17.

The Hardingers will have Baylie August 15, 2000 through
August 21 s t , from 9:00 a.m. on the 15th to 7:30 p.m. on the 21 st .

18.

Although not one of the four weeks fnr inmiimrt l/aLirtwan, the
Hardingers will have Baylie from December 27lh through January
V\ 2001, this is the second half of the Christmas School Break.

,

. ,

19.

The remainder of the Hardingers four weeks of^iiimmpr v ^ j ^ r i for the year 2000 shall be worked out with the Special

Master.
20.

The Scott's shall have four weeks of family vacation with
Baylie.

21.

For the year 2000, Baylie will be with the Scott's from April
9th through April 16th for a trip to Disney Land.

22.

Baylie will be with the Scott's from May 12th through the 14th
for a baseball tournament in Wendover.

23.

Baylie will be with the Scott's from June 30th through July 15th
for a trip to Mexico.

24.

Lorraine Warren shall have extended summer visitation each
year.

The visitation for the ypar 2000 shall be from August 4th
erf J***t pnjt

through August
25.

uu*&.

13 t h and/ai like* amount each year thereafter.

The parties will work with the Special Master in scheduling
events such as birthdays and other family events.

26.

The parties have agreed to and the Court should appoint a
Special Master.

If available, Liz Dalton is hereby appointed by the

Court to be a Special Master.
27.

The cost of the Special Master is to be shared equally for joint
sessions.

For individual time with the Special Master, the party

who has the individual time with the Special Master shall be
responsible for payment for that time.
28.

The Special Master is appointed to work with the parties to
implement the visitation schedule, facilitate communication
assist in problem solving.

and

29.

The Special Master may consult with the Guardian ad Litem as
necessary.

30.

The parties have agreed to work with a Special Master and to
adopt a family plan which will include but is not limited to the

provisions set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-33.
DATED this J±_

day of

./S'X

"~~yW,<L~f #£/\^ £ N '. L j>06$.l
/

=3:

|0\

—'*

<

co0^ x

JUD^TEREt^ WIL'SSk
Approved as to Form:

Kelly Frye
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APPENDIX "D"
Order to Show Cause (R. 368-369)

FILED
DANAD. BURROWS - 5045
Attorney for Intervenor Maternal Grandparents
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Juvenile Court

Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700

Fourth

_
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
BLUNDELL, BAYLIE

2

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

7/29/96

A Person(s) under eighteen years of age

Case #968282 001
Judge Jeril B. Wilson

TO HLMBERLY AND KEN SCOTT:
You are hereby ordered to appear before the above-entitled Court on Tuesday, the 29th day
of August, 2000, at 10:00 a.m., before Judge Jeril B. Wilson, at the courthouse located at Fourth
District Juvenile Court, 2021 South State, Provo, Utah then and there to show cause, if any you have:
1.

Why you should not be held in contempt of court for your refusal to comply with the order
of the court as it relates to in person visitation as well as telephone visitation and why the
court should not impose appropriate sanctions at the time of the hearing.

2.

Why the Hardinger's should not be entitled to make up visitation.

3.

Why you should not be responsible for the Hardinger's attorney's fees and costs with the
Special Master as a result of your noncompliance and refusal to follow the Special Master.

4.

Why the court should not specify the telephone visitation and enter such orders that will allow
telephone visitation to occur and ordering you to allow Baylie to return phone calls.

5.

Why you should not be responsible for counseling costs that have been necessitated and will
continue for a period of time.

6.

Why the court should not change custody residence of Baylie Blundellfromyou immediately
to the Hardingers.

7.

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and appropriate in this matter.
DATED this Q~(

day of August, 2000.
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APPENDIX "E"
Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgement (R. 525-527)

FILEO
OCT E 4 2000

DANAD.BURROWS-5045

Jisvemie Court

Attorney for Intervenor Maternal Grandparents
1149 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700

Fourth District

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
BLUNDELL,BAYLIE

4

ORDER OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND JUDGEMENT

7/29/96

A Person(s) under eighteen years of age

Case #968282 001
Judge Jeril B. Wilson

The above-entitled matter having come before the court by way of the Maternal Grandparents,
Garth and Susan Hardinger's request for attorney's fees as a result of their Order to Show Cause and
the court having had the opportunity to consider the matter and being fiilly advised in the premises,
now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The attorney's fees incurred by Garth and Susan Hardinger were reasonable and necessary
under the circumstances.

2.

The fees were incurred in large part because of the Scott's failure to comply with the
recommendations of the Special Master, Elizabeth Dalton, which necessitated the Order to
Show Cause hearing.

00521

3.

The Hardinger's are awarded judgment against Ken and Kimberly Scott for attorney's fees
in the amount of $2,795.17.

APPROVAL AS TO FORM

BROOKE! SESSIONS
Attorney for Scotts

APPROVAL AS TO FORM

KELLY FRYE
Guardian ad Litem

DATED this 2- V

&

day of Sept^*er^2000.

v»«iimi///;,.

.WILSOH. C O ^ ' / * DISTRICT COURT J U T J ^ A - . . .
..-v^

NOTICE TO SCOTT'S ATTORNEY AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM

TO: BROOK J. SESSIONS, Attorney for Scotts and KELLY FRYE, Guardian Ad Litem
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for Intervenor Maternal
Grandparents, Garth and Susan Hardinger, will submit the above and foregoing Order of Attorney's
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Fees and Judgment to the Fourth District Court for signature, upon the expiration offive(5) days
from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection isfiledprior to
that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
DATED this

/ ^^

day of September, 2000.

Attorney for Intervenor Maternal Grandparents
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

1%^

day of September, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Order of Attorney's Fees and Judgment, postage prepaid, to the following;
Brook J. Sessions
3325 N University Ave Ste 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg
Provo UT 84604
Kelly Frye
Guardian Ad Litem
32 W Center St
Provo UT 84601

'uXfrAD. BURROWS
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APPENDIX "F"
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 528-533)

OCT 2 4 2000
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Juvenile Cour
^ o u r t h DJStrlC

STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest of:
FINDING OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

BLUNDELL, BAYLIE 07/29/96
A person under 18 years of age,

Case Number 968282
This matter having come before the Court on Wednesday, September 6, 2000, for hearing
on the Hardinger's Motion for Hearing requesting the Scotts be held in contempt of the Court for
failing to allow visitation. Ken and Kimberly Scott appeared with their attorney, Brook Sessions.
Susan and Garth Hardinger appeared with their attorney Dana Burrows. Baylie's Guardian Ad
Litem, Kelly Frye appeared on Baylie's behalf. The court appointed Special Master appeared and
gave a report to the court. The Court heard arguments from counsel and reviewed the pleadings
on file and the report from that Special Master but did not take testimony. Being duly advised in
the premises, the Court makes the following:
FINDING OF FACT
1. On February 23, 1999, Ken and Kimberly Scott, paternal aunt and uncle filed a
petition in Juvenile Court for custody of Bay lie Blundell.
2. On May 12, 1999, Susan and Garth Hardinger, maternal grandparents filed a petition
in Juvenile Court for custody of Bay lie Blundell.
3. On September 28, 1999, Fourth District Judge James Taylor certified the issues of
custody, visitation, and child support to the Fourth District Juvenile Court.
4. On November 23,1999, an evidentiary hearing took place wherein the parental rights
of both the father and the mother of Bay lie Blundell were terminated.
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5. Through the efforts of court ordered mediation the Hardingers withdrew their petition
for custody and supported adoption by the Scotts. In return, the Scotts agreed to allow future
visitation to the Hardingers.
6. On May 19, 2000, pursuant to stipulation, the Court granted custody and guardianship
of the minor, Baylie Blundell to Ken and Kimberly Scott. The stipulation provided that the
Hardingers would withdraw their Petition for Custody and Guardianship in return for visitation
with Baylie.

The Stipulation of the parties also included that the Hardingers would support the

adoption of Baylie by the Scotts.
7. The visitation order of May 19, 2000 appointed a Special Master to help the parties
implement the visitation.
8. The Decree of Adoption entered on June 5, 2000 granted the Scott's Petition to adopt
Baylie. The Decree changes Baylie Blundell's name to Baylie Scott. The Decree of Adoption
does not address visitation.
9. Juvenile Court file number 986074 is entitled State of Utah in the interest of Baylie
Scott and is a sealed adoption file.
10. Juvenile Court file number 968282 is entitled State of Utah in the interest of Baylie
Blundell and addresses the proceedings prior to the adoption.
11. Pursuant to statute, the adoption file was sealed.
12. On or about August 11, 2000, counsel for the Hardingers filed a Motion for an Order
to Show Cause to enforce the visitation order signed May 19, 2000.
13. On or about August 17, 2000, the Court signed the Hardinger's Order to Appear and
Show Cause.
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14. Said Motion and signed Order were sent to counsel for Ken and Kimberly Scott by
counsel for the Hardingers on August 11, 2000.
15. Personal service on Ken and Kimberly Scott was not obtained.
16. No Motion was made to reopen the closed adoption file.
17. No Motion was made to unseal the adoption file.
18. On or about August 25,^2000 counsel for the Scott's filed a motion to Quash the
Order to Appear and Show Cause.
19. The Motion to Quash requests the Order to Show Cause be quashed for the following
reasons: the file has not been unsealed nor reopened; the Juvenile Court does not have
jurisdiction after the adoption; and that the Order of Custody and Guardianship does not survive
the adoption.
20. At the September 6, 2000 hearing counsel for the Scotts made an oral motion to
certify the case back to the District Court and transfer the file, which motion was denied.
21. At the September 6, 2000 hearing counsel for the Scotts made an oral motion to stay
the order of visitation pending an appeal, which motion was denied.
22. The court finds that after June 24, 2000 the Scotts have not allowed visitation to the
Hardingers as required by the Order.
23. Initially such refusal may have been justified because of allegations of sexual abuse,
however, continued refusal of visitation after safeguards were suggested was not justified.
24. The Court finds the Scotts have not followed the continuing recommendation of the
Special Master for visitation.
25. The Scotts presented by Affidavit the reasons for their denial of visitation.
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26. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to enforce its visitation order of May 19, 2000.
27. Baylie had resided predominately with Hardingers from the time of her birth until
March 12, 1999, a period of 31 months and during this period the Hardingers had been Baylie's
primary care giver.
28. Baylie has a significant attachment to both the Scotts and the Hardingers.
29. It is in the best interest of Baylie to have visitation with the Hardingers. Both Dr.
Featherstone and Dr. Williams (the evaluators) found that there was a strong bond between
Baylie and the Hardingers and that visitation was in Baylie's best interest.
30. It is in Baylie's best interest that the parties not discuss the alleged sexual abuse with
her.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to enforce its visitation order of May 19, 2000
2. The Court granted the Order of Custody and Guardianship dated May 19, 2000 and the
adoption dated June 5, 2000, of the minor, Baylie Blundell to Ken and Kimberly Scott because of
the stipulation between the Scotts and the Hardingers which provided the Hardingers would
withdraw their Petition for Custody and Guardianship in return for visitation
3. The Court finds that the Hardingers withdrew their petition for custody and supported
adoption by the Scotts because of the Scotts agreement to allow future visitation to the
Hardingers.
4. It is in the best interest of Baylie to have visitation with the Hardingers.
5. The parties are to cooperate with and obtain a family evaluation and psychosexual
investigation by Dr. Jay Jensen.
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6. Each party is to pay one half of Dr. Jensen's fee. Final apportionment is reserved to a
later date.
7. The parties shall follow the recommendations of Dr. Jensen, the Guardian ad Litem,
Dr. Jenkins and the Special Master for future visitation.
ORDER
1. Scott's Motion to Quash is denied.
2. Scott's motion to certify the case back to the District Court is denied.
3. Scott's motion to stay visitation is denied.
4. The parties shall follow the recommendations of Dr. Jensen, the Guardian ad Litem,
Dr. Jenkins and the Special Master for future visitation except that Garth Hardinger is to have no
contact with Baylie except in a supervised clinical setting.
5. Garth Hardinger is to submit to a psychosexual evaluation prior to the next court
review.
6. The parties are to cooperate with and obtain a family evaluation and psychosexual
investigation by Dr. Jay Jensen.
7. Each party is to pay one half of Dr. Jensen's fee. Final apportionment is reserved to a
later date.
8. The next court review will be December 11. 2000 at 9:00 a.m.
Dated this Z1^

day of October 2000

BY THE COURT

/'^'["X

j[gj

_*—

JOE

Judge Jeril B. W ^ b n ° u U ^

/ ^
*^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAKING
I hereby certify that on this Hfj day of October, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the forgoing Finding of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order to the following:
Attorney Brook Sessions
3325 N University Avenue Suite 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Building
Provo, UT 84604
Attorney Kelly Frye
Guardian Ad Litem
Box at Juvenile Court
Attorney Dana Burrows
1149 West Center
Orem, UT 84057
)eputy Clerk

oo

APPENDIX "G"
Notice of Appeal (R. 536-538)

FILED
NOV 01 2000
Juvenile Court
Fourth District
BROOK J. SESSIONS (6136)
HARRIS & CARTER

STATE OF UTAH 1 e e
COUNTY OF UTAH J S S
1, the undersigned, Clerk of the Juvenile District Court of
Utah County, Utah, do hereby certify that the annexed and
foregomg is a true and full copy of an original document
on file in my office.
Witness my hand and seal of said court this
2*^
day of ~7l SYzw

Attorneys for Parents (Scotts)
3325 N. Univ. #200
Provo U T 84604

fa*

»

£t>tio

prt Clerk ~

Phone: (801) 375-9801 Fax: (801) 377-1149

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
In the interest of:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

BLUNDELL, BAYLBE (07/29/96)
Case No.: 968282 001
Persons under eighteen (18) years of age.
Judge: JERIL B. WILSON

TO THE ABOVE COURT, THE HARDINGERS, THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM,
THE SPECIAL MASTER, AGENTS OF THE ABOVE, AND TO DANA BURROWS:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Ken and Kimberly Scott, by and
through his counsel, Brook Sessions of Harris & Carter, hereby
appeal the ruling of the Court on the Motion to Quash and
Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file.
This appeal is to The Utah Court of Appeals.

This notice is

filed within 30 days of said judgment and is otherwise timely.
The Clerk of the above court is requested to transmit to the

appellate court the records and other documents as is required by
law.

Brook Sessions PC

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the J

day of-August, 2000,1 mailed or delivered a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to each of the following:

Dana Burrows
Attorney at Law
1149 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
Ms. Elizabeth Dalton
Court Appointed Special Master
11509 N.Granite Circle
Highland UT 84003
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem
Attention: Kelly Frye
32 W. Center #205
Provo UT 84601
Phone: 344-8516 Fax:

/ O
Secretary

«
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APPENDIX "H"
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3

MICHIES UTAH RULES ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1953-2002 by the Michie Company
A Division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc.
All Rights Reserved
* THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH CHANGES RECEIVED AS OF
FEBRUARY 20, 2002 *
STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS
Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 (2002)
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments.
An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided
by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed
by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal but is ground only for such action as the
appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals.
If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in
an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal Joint appeals may
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated
by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by
stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties.
The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the
appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the petitioner and
any other party as the respondent.

(d) Content of notice of appeal.
The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate
the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which
the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal.
The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or
order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal.
If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party
represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals.
At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party
taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The
clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal.
Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fee, the clerk of the
trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the
date of its filing, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that
the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An
appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the
appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such
name shall be added to the title.
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999

APPENDIX "I"
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-121 (Supp. 2002)

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 5TH SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2002 UT 35, 2002 UT APP 82 ***
*** AND MARCH 10, 2002 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PARTI. COURTS
CHAPTER 3a. JUVENILE COURTS
PARTI. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-121 (2002)
§ 78-3a-121. Continuing jurisdiction of juvenile court — Period of and termination of
jurisdiction — Notice of discharge from custody of Division of Substance Abuse and Mental
Health or Utah State Developmental Center — Transfer of continuing jurisdiction to other
district
(1) Jurisdiction of a minor obtained by the court through adjudication under Section 78-3a118 continues for purposes of this chapter until he becomes 21 years of age, unless
terminated earlier. However, the court retains jurisdiction beyond the age of 21 of a person
who has refused or failed to pay any fine or victim restitution ordered by the court, but only
for the purpose of causing compliance with existing orders.
(2) (a) The continuing jurisdiction of the court terminates:
(i) upon order of the court;
(ii) upon commitment to a secure youth corrections facility; or
(iii) upon commencement of proceedings in adult cases under Section 78-3a-801.
(b) The continuing jurisdiction of the court is not terminated by marriage.
(3) When a minor has been committed by the court to the custody of the Division of
Substance Abuse and Mental Health, a local mental health authority or its designee, or to the
Utah State Developmental Center, the director of the Division of Substance Abuse and
Mental Health, the local mental health authority or its designee, or the superintendent of the
Utah State Developmental Center shall give the court written notice of its intention to

discharge, release, or parole the minor not fewer than five days prior to the discharge,
release, or parole.
(4) Jurisdiction over a minor on probation or under protective supervision, or of a minor
who is otherwise under the continuing jurisdiction of the court, may be transferred by the
court to the court of another district, if the receiving court consents, or upon direction of the
chair of the Board of Juvenile Court Judges. The receiving court has the same powers with
respect to the minor that it would have if the proceedings originated in that court.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-3a-520, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 1, § 67; 1996, ch. 234, § 17;
renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 365, § 35; 2002 (5th S.S.), ch. 8, § 141.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added "a local
mental health authority or its designee" twice in Subsection (3).
The 1997 amendment, effective March 21,1997, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 78-3a-520, and updated internal references in Subsection (1).
The 2002 (5th S.S ) amendment, effective September 8. 2002, added "Substance Abuse
and" before "Mental Health" twice in Subsection (3).
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 makes the act effective on January 31,1996.

APPENDIX "J"
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (Supp. 2002)

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 5TH SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2002 UT 35, 2002 UT APP 82 ***
*** AND MARCH 10, 2002 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PARTI. COURTS
CHAPTER 3a. JUVENILE COURTS
PART 9. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-901 (2002)
§ 78-3a-901. Violation of order of court ~ Contempt — Penalty
(1) Any person who willfully violates or refuses to obey any order of the court may be
proceeded against for contempt of court.
(2) Any person 18 years of age or older found in contempt of court may be punished in
accordance with Section 78-32-10.
(3) (a) Any person younger than 18 years of age found in contempt of court may be
punished by any disposition permitted under Section 78-3a-l 18, except for commitment to
a secure facility.
(b) The court may stay or suspend all or part of the punishment upon compliance with
conditions imposed by the court.
(4) The court may enforce orders of fines, fees, or restitution through garnishments, wage
withholdings, supplementary proceedings, or executions.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-3a-901, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 1, § 76; 1997, ch. 358, § 2.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted the
phrase beginning "in accordance with" in Subsection (2) and "any disposition" in Subsection

(3) for a list of specific penalties and in Subsection (3)(b) substituted "the punishment" for
"the fine or the commitment to the Division of Youth Corrections."
COORDINATION CLAUSE. -Laws 1997, ch. 358, § 4 directs that "Section 78-3a-l 18"
be substituted for "Section 78-3a-516" in Subsection (3)(a) to conform to renumbering by
L.1997,ch 365.
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 makes the act effective on January 31,1996.

NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE CHAPTER
REVISION OF CHAPTER.Laws 1996, ch. 1 revised this chapter by repealing § § 78-3a-l
through 78-3a-65, governing procedure in juvenile courts, and enacting new sections
throughout the chapter, effective January 31, 1996. A table of comparable provisions,
prepared by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, appears below the
repeal note under § 78-3a-l.
COMPILER'S NOTES.Laws 1997, ch. 329, which enacted or amended sections throughout
this chapter, provides that it "applies to every abuse, neglect, and dependency case in which
parental rights have not been terminated as of July 1, 1997. All other provisions of Title 78,
Chapter 3a relating to abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings, and Title 62A, Chapter
4a apply to every case in which parental rights have not been terminated as of the effective
date of the applicable statute."

